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In this paper I examine Max Deutscher’s recent accounts of thinking, willing and 
judging, derived from his reading of Hannah Arendt’s The Life of the Mind, as set out in 
his book Judgment After Arendt. Against Deutscher I argue that thinking does not 
presuppose thoughtfulness, that being willing is compatible with willing reluctantly, and 
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THINKING, WILLING AND JUDGING 
‘To dismantle metaphysics requires me to take it in hand. Inevitably some sticks to my fingers.’i 
 
BEING MINDFUL OF THE MIND 
 
In this paper we shall enter into conversation with Max Deutscher’s most recent book, Judgment After Arendt. 
Deutscher’s book is an extended engagement with Hannah Arendt’s trilogy, The Life of the Mind, and its books 
on thinking, willing and judging.ii While Deutscher’s book is based around a close and, at times, page by page 
reading of Arendt’s book, his book is not, in the usual sense, a piece of Arendt scholarship. Deutscher only very 
occasionally engages, in any depth, with Arendt’s other texts or with the extensive secondary literature on 
Arendt.iii This approach allows Deutscher to avoid getting mired in what have become the clichés of that 
literature, such as the alleged contradiction between Arendt’s two accounts of judgment,iv recast The Life of the 
Mind as a work primarily in phenomenology rather than in political theory (as it is often read), and broaden the 
scope of his own project by extending the range of interlocutors who are brought into dialogue with Arendt’s 
work.v  
 
While Deutscher’s ‘ec-centric’ style of writing (‘[t]he hyphen disturbs the slur and reminds us of the 
inflexion’)vi is very different to Arendt’s, he nonetheless shares with her a similar method, a ‘historically 
informed’ ‘post-metaphysics’ ‘influenced by phenomenology,’vii a method that is at once ‘historical, fictional, 
poetic and analytical.’viii This method, which is at home in our postmodern worldix and which draws freely and 
expertly upon both analytic and continental philosophical traditions, employs phenomenology to deconstruct 
metaphysics. Deutscher employs this method in Judgment After Arendt to investigate the life of the mind. 
 
In so doing Deutscher, following Arendt, examines the natural impulse we have to think about the mind in 
dualistic and metaphysical terms. This impulse is not rejected as a sloppy inference.x Instead, the 
phenomenology of thinking that underwrites our impulse toward dualism is vindicated. When we think it really 
is as if we are no-where and no-when, as if we are lost in a world of thought, a world bound by laws of reason 
rather than laws of causality. This is no mere fallacy or simple illusion, a ‘mirage that vanishes as we 
approach.’xi Someone who is thinking really is ‘somewhere else’; we talk to them, but they are utterly oblivious 
to what we say. They are lost in thought. ‘Hello!’ we cry, to call them back from wherever they have gone.xii 
 
But while Deutscher accepts that the experience or phenomenology of thinking, willing, and judging 
underwrites ‘impulses toward dualism,’ he rejects the ontological conclusions that the dualist draws.xiii Talk of 
being no-where and no-when when we think, or of an immaterial world of thought objects, is metaphorical talk. 
It is metaphorical talk because we cross directly over from one category to another by using terms at home in 
sensation and observation, and apply these directly to another category, that of the mind. We speak of thinking, 
nous, as the mind’s eye. But we do not see things (invisible thought-things) with the mind like we see things 
with the eye. Rather it is the ‘relation between the eye and the object we see that can resemble the relation 
between nous and the object we think.’xiv The brain is like the eye, but the mind, as the power of thinking, 
willing and judging that our brains make us capable of, is like the power of seeing that our eyes make us capable 
of.xv The mistake of dualism is to take our experience of the life of the mind, and the metaphorical language we 
use to describe it, and reify those metaphors into hard ontological fact. 
 
In this way Deutscher reads Arendt, along with Gilbert Ryle (who was one of Deutscher’s Oxford teachers),xvi 
as engaged in the project of understanding the mind in a way that avoids both dualism and reductive 
materialism. This approach rejects the dualist’s claim that there are two worlds or two types of substance, one 
material and one immaterial. There is not a mind substance and a body substance, a Cartesian ghost in the 
machine to employ Ryle’s evocative phrase,xvii but rather a body that can think, will and judge; a ‘thinking, 
willing and judging body.’xviii But this approach does not fall into reductive materialism. While, of course, the 
‘mind is the brain’ and ‘thinking is a brain process,’ only the dualist denies this, this identification doesn’t end 
the story.xix This is because poking around in grey matter will tell us very little, by itself, about the life of the 
mind, about thinking, willing and judging. As such, ‘it remains a conceptual and phenomenological business to 
describe what brain processes make us capable of.’xx 
 
We are now in a position, having very briefly explored Deutscher’s general approach to the life of the mind, to 
critically differ with the details of his Arendtian accounts of thinking, willing and judging. Such differing is 
essential to thinking. Indeed, plurality, differing from one another, is defining of the human condition as Arendt 
understands it. But we can differ without parting company or, rather, we only keep each other (and ourselves) 
company by being different, by differing. In his generous reading of Arendt Deutscher writes: ‘A ‘flat’ 
contradiction is stationary, the stultification of thought. In contrast, to be contradicted within thinking’s 
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conversation is a critically friendly re-animation of the conversation.’xxi It is in this spirit of keeping the 




Arendt’s investigation into thinking emerged, to a significant degree, out of her coverage of Adolf Eichmann’s 
trial in Jerusalem.xxii After covering his trial Arendt came to the judgment that Eichmann was no monster. He 
was not driven by deep ideological hatred of Jews. Indeed the ‘only notable characteristic’ about him that she 
could detect was something ‘entirely negative: it was not stupidity but thoughtlessness.’xxiii Arendt explains: 
 
Clichés, stock phrases, adherence to conventional, standardized codes of expression and conduct have 
the socially recognized function of protecting us against reality, that is, against the claim on our thinking 
attention that all events and facts make by virtue of their existence. If we were responsive to this claim 
all the time, we would soon be exhausted; Eichmann differed from the rest of us only in that he clearly 
knew no such claim at all. It was this absence of thinking – which is so ordinary an experience in our 
everyday life … - that awakened my interest.xxiv 
 
Such an ‘absence of thought’xxv is common enough. We are often too busy to stop and think, and sometimes 
thinking about what we are doing only gets in the way of doing it. But if the absence of thinking is such an 
ordinary experience in our everyday lives, so too is the presence of thinking – or at least for most us, but 
seemingly not for Eichmann (‘he clearly knew no such claim at all’) on Arendt’s account. As such, Arendt 
moves straight from the claim that Eichmann is to be characterised as thoughtless to the claim that he did not 
know the experience of thinking. But this move is too quick since thoughtfulness and thinking are two different 
things. In contrast to Arendt, Deutscher is attentive to this distinction. But while he is attentive to this 
distinction, he ends up endorsing Arendt’s view that in the case of Eichmann we witness ‘the absence of a 
common and ordinary thing [thinking].’xxvi On this view thinking is a common and ordinary activity, something 
that we all engage in all the time, that is, all of us except Eichmann (and perhaps some others). 
 
Deutscher adopts this solution since he argues that thinking presupposes thoughtfulness. Deutscher claims that: 
‘Thoughtfulness must frame any inner life that amounts to conversing with oneself.’xxvii Thinking is the activity 
of conversing with oneself that occurs within a ‘thoughtful frame of mind’, where such a frame of mind is 
understood as a ‘readiness to think.’xxviii This view, however, retains the problematic tension inherent in 
Arendt’s account as it forces us, since thinking presupposes thoughtfulness, to move from the claim that 
Eichmann was thoughtless (a plausible claim) to the claim that he did not think (an implausible claim). 
However, the claim that a normal, sane (but thoughtless) adult human, as Eichmann was taken to be (‘Half a 
dozen psychiatrists had certified him as ‘normal’’),xxix might never engage in the activity of thinking per se (in 
any sense of the term) will be shown to be implausible. 
 
What is the difference between thoughtfulness and thinking? Thoughtfulness refers to a way of being or doing; 
being thoughtful or doing something thoughtfully. To be thoughtful is to be mindful of who you are and what 
you are doing. It is to be aware of the significance and meaning of what you are doing while you are doing it. 
Thoughtfulness can refer to a character trait, that of being a thoughtful person, or more generally to a way, 
manner, or style of undertaking some activity or project, namely to undertake it thoughtfully. In contrast, 
thinking refers to a specific type of activity, a particular sort of doing - that of thinking. Thinking is a first order 
activity, something we do, just like running, swimming and reading are things that we do. Thoughtfulness is a 
second order activity, a particular way of undertaking a first order activity. But we cannot undertake just any 
activity thoughtfully. Consider the case of a person throwing paper balls into a bucket to relieve boredom. Such 
a person might be very focused on what he is doing. But we would not say that he is undertaking that activity 
thoughtfully, since it is an utterly mindless activity (as we say), not something that one can undertake 
thoughtfully. This is because there needs to be some significance or meaning to an activity in order to be able to 
undertake it thoughtfully. 
 
We can be thoughtful (and also thoughtless, that is, not thoughtful) about both what we are thinking and what 
we are doing. To think thoughtfully is not merely to think but to think about what you are thinking; to be 
mindful of the meaning and significance of your thoughts. To think thoughtlessly is not to be mindful of your 
thoughts in this way. It is to just think, as when I just hit the ball. It is to just think about, for example, how to 
get from here to there, what a great holiday you had last year, which building is now the world’s tallest, and so 
on. To think thoughtfully is to have a thoughtful conversation with yourself by questioning and interrogating 
your own thoughts; it is to ask yourself why you want to go where you are going, why you thought it was such a 
great holiday, what a holiday even is and how it differs from a journey, from travel, from work, and so on. To 
act thoughtlessly is to just do what you are doing without reflecting on the significance or meaning of what you 
56 
 
are doing, without in some cases even being particularly aware that you are doing it. For example, you are 
running through the forest and, after a while, you forget that you are even running. You aren’t aware of lifting 
your feet, dodging the rocks, sucking in air, and so on. You might even begin to think about what you will have 
for dinner while you are running, or start to think thoughtfully about a deep philosophical problem. Thus while 
you are undertaking one activity thoughtlessly, in this case running, you might be undertaking another activity, 
in this case thinking, thoughtfully. But it is hard to do more than one thing at a time thoughtfully. 
 
To see why, consider the example of a person who needs to walk through a crowd. He can walk through the 
crowd thoughtlessly, bumping into others as he walks forward without really caring or even noticing, oblivious 
to where he is in relation to others, his mind focused elsewhere. Or he can walk through the crowd thoughtfully, 
trying to avoid bumping into others, aware of where he is and where others are and the way his bag swings 
behind him, ready to offer an apology (which is genuine, not words uttered as a sort of reflex) whenever he 
inadvertently bumps into anyone. Being acutely aware of his surroundings, he stops spontaneously to help the 
woman who drops her bag in front of him in the middle of the crowd (the thoughtless person barely even notices 
this). ‘How thoughtful,’ she exclaims as he hands back her bag. But it is very hard to think thoughtfully while 
also walking through a crowd thoughtfully. If you are busy thinking deeply and thoughtfully about some 
difficult metaphysical problem, then your mind is elsewhere. You are absentminded. Your mind is therefore too 
preoccupied with its own thoughts to notice those around you. In this case to undertake one activity, that of 
thinking, thoughtfully, is to thereby undertake another activity, that of walking through the crowd, thoughtlessly, 
and vice versa. 
 
A thoughtful person is someone who judges well what needs to be thought about and when it needs to be 
thought about, as well as what needs to be undertaken thoughtfully, and what does not, and when it does and 
does not. This illustrates the double-edged nature of thinking. Both too much and too little thinking, or thinking 
undertaken without judgment (at the wrong time, for example), has its dangers.xxx Too much thinking can make 
us withdrawn and distant from the world so that we lose touch with it and become likely to bump into things and 
people, whereas too little thinking can fail to alert us to the moral significance of our actions. There is also 
tension between thinking and thoughtfulness since being thoughtful about what we are doing, such as walking 
through a crowd, can get in the way of thinking, and thinking can in turn get in the way of being thoughtful 
about other things. A thoughtful person judges well what to be thoughtful about and when to undertake a 
particular activity, be it thinking or acting, thoughtfully. 
 
But while a thoughtful person (among other things) necessarily thinks, a person who thinks is not necessarily a 
thoughtful person. A thoughtless person, someone who fails to think about what she is doing and the effects this 
will have on others, may still engage in the activity of thinking. Thus one can think without being thoughtful, 
that is, one can think in a way that is not thoughtful. Such thinking skims along the surface. It fails to unearth the 
significance of what one is thinking. But it is still thinking, even if it is not thoughtful thinking. In this sense 
thinking is an everyday activity, something we all do all the time, even though few of us are ideally thoughtful 
people. 
 
We can (and do) think about all sorts of things and people, real and unreal, possible and impossible, about 
events from the past or events that might happen or can never happen, about theories, concepts, words, stories, 
films, desires, dreams, and so on. This often takes the form of what we shall call ‘everyday thinking.’xxxi 
Everyday thinking is a near relative of remembering and imagining. Indeed, as Deutscher notes, ‘to remember is 
to begin to think.’xxxii To think in this sense is to withdraw from the world for a time to dwell upon 
something.xxxiii To dwell upon something is to concentrate and focus on it, to explicitly direct attention toward it, 
and not merely to daydream about it in an unfocused manner. In this sense we can think about something, 
especially when we stick to the surface of things, even if our frame of mind is not characterised by 
thoughtfulness. We can think without accompanying second order thoughtfulness about what we are thinking 
and why we are thinking it. 
 
In this sense it is undeniable that Eichmann sometimes, perhaps often, engaged in the activity of (at least 
‘everyday’) thinking. Eichmann sometimes, surely, thought about what he would do on the weekend, what he 
would have for dinner, the day he was married or joined the S.S., his favourite book, how he could efficiently 
transport Jews to death camps, and so on. Sometimes, no doubt, he dwelt in thought upon such issues, and he 
may have even done so thoughtfully. What disturbs us is not that Eichmann did not think, but that he was not 
thoughtful about something of such immense moral importance as genocide. His thoughts about what he was 
doing stayed on the surface of things; how to organise this, who to contact to get that done, who to assign this 
piece of work to, who to impress in order to gain promotion, and so on. He failed to be thoughtful about what he 
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was doing in thinking such thoughts, about the meaning and significance of such actions for others and for 
himself. This is immensely disturbing. 
 
How could he be like this?xxxiv A thoughtless person simply doesn’t give others a thought. Imagine the case of a 
schoolboy who sits on a seat at the front of the crowded bus while a frail elderly lady struggles to stay standing 
next to him in the aisle. Such a schoolboy is being thoughtless, utterly oblivious to the impact his behaviour is 
having on others and the meaning and significance of what he is doing in occupying the seat while the elderly 
lady struggles to stand. (She could easily fall, break a hip, and never properly recover). In contrast, the 
schoolboy who is thinking with pleasure of the elderly lady struggling next to him is not thoughtless but 
malicious. (Hitler, unlike Eichmann, was thus not thoughtless). But it is one thing to sit on a crowded bus 
thoughtlessly, oblivious to others, and quite another to organise genocide while remaining largely oblivious to 
the moral significance of one’s actions. That Eichmann could do so illustrates the shocking degree to which 
thoughtlessness, as Arendt puts it, can shield us from all claims of reality. 
 
The case of Eichmann shows us that one can think, that one can (say) dwell upon how best to transport people to 
death camps, without thinking thoughtfully about what one is doing in (and the significance and meaning of) 
thinking such thoughts. Thus, in an everyday sense of thinking, thinking does not presuppose thoughtfulness. 
However, there is another sense of thinking which does presuppose thoughtfulness. This is a philosophical (as 
opposed to everyday) sense of thinking, where this is understood as a thoughtful conversation between intimate 
friends. One problem that emerges with both Arendt’s and Deutscher’s approach is that they try to force 
everyday thinking into a broader account of (philosophical) thinking, as conversation between friends, to which 
it does not belong. 
 
Arendt, more so than Deutscher, comes to see thinking per se as a conversation whereby we actualise our inner 
plurality and split into a two-in-one, where we are both the one who asks questions and the one (or two) who 
answers them. To think in this sense is to have a conversation with ourselves, a sort of internal Socratic dialogue 
about the meaning of something. This second order concern with the significance and meaning of what we are 
thinking is a clear sign of thoughtfulness. Thinking, in this sense, ‘unfreezes’ concepts by destabilising their 
meaning, as when Socrates unfreezes justice, piety or courage, or when Arendt (drawing on Heidegger) 
unfreezes the concept of a house.xxxv But just as not every flow of words counts as conversation, not every 
jumble of words counts as thinking on this account. For inner dialogue to be thinking it must be a conversation, 
and a conversation is not mere ‘empty-headed chatter’.xxxvi Thinking is the activity of conversing with oneself or 
engaging in internal dialogue conducted ‘within a thoughtful frame of mind’, that is, within a frame of mind 
marked by a ‘readiness to think.’xxxvii Otherwise, on this account, it is not really thinking. 
 
Deutscher adds further nuance to this account by looking at the example of a painter ‘who thinks of which paint 
to put next, where, in what style’ and so on. Although the painter is not ‘making [internal] utterances’ about 
which paint to put where, Deutscher stretches the idea of a conversation without words to deal with this case. 
This is plausible since in this example the painter is considering the ‘pros and cons’ of ‘differing juxtapositions 
of colour,’ even though there is no explicit ‘private [verbal] muttering’ of those pros and cons in the way that a 
writer might ‘internally voice trial sentences.’xxxviii Thus thinking is conversing with oneself within a thoughtful 
frame of mind, where conversation is not ‘tied too tightly to the production of inner verbiage’.xxxix 
 
But this concession isn’t enough since not all thinking can be construed as thoughtful conversation with 
ourselves even when conversation is broadly understood. To illustrate this point we can reuse the earlier 
example of someone thinking about the last holiday she went on. She is not debating with herself, even without 
words, the pros and cons of her holiday, or meditating upon its meaning or significance. Rather she is savouring 
it, recalling it, dwelling upon it. She thinks about how pleasant it was to sit on the beach, feel the sand under her 
feet, smell the ocean and hear the waves crashing down. Here ‘thinking’ is closer to remembering than 
conversing; it is not thoughtful thinking, but it is thinking nonetheless. Thinking as the two-in-one of a pair of 
internal debating partners makes little sense of these sorts of cases. Of course, she might also start to think in 
this way. She begins to think about what a holiday is, what counts as leisure, work and labour, how a holiday 
differs from a trip, a journey, travel, and so on. She starts to unfreeze concepts. But not all thinking is thoughtful 
in this way. 
 
Further, even in this sense of thinking as the two-in-one of internal thoughtful conversation, it seems undeniable 
that Eichmann sometimes undertook this activity. Surely he had internal conversations with himself about the 
pros and cons of certain proposed actions, not just about which tie to wear, but about weighty issues, such as 
whether or not to sabotage Himmler’s orders when they become more ‘moderate’ by the fall of 1944,xl given 
that such orders seemed to Eichmann to be opposed to the will of the Führer, and the ‘Führer’s words had the 
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force of law.’xli Surely Eichmann thought about this, talked with himself about the pros and cons, and did so 
without flippancy but in a thoughtful manner, aware of the gravity of the situation. He even had to partly 
unfreeze the concept of legality to determine the ‘criminality’ of Himmler’s illicit ‘moderation’ of the Führer’s 
will.xlii  
 
It is too broad, then, to simply say that Eichmann lacked a ‘thoughtful frame of mind’ or a readiness to think. He 
was ready to think about many things, the sorts of things that we all think about (what we will have for dinner, 
our first love, what counts as ‘legality’, and so on), but his thinking remained trapped in unquestioned clichés, 
language rules, and conventionality (obey the will of the Führer!). Further, Eichmann was not ready to think 
about the victims of his actions; that just made him ill. Eichmann speaks of feeling ‘physically weak’ and being 
‘upset’ by what he personally saw of the actual killing of Jews in Chelmno. ‘I hardly looked. I could not; I had 
had enough. The shrieking, and … I was much too upset.’xliii Eichmann thinks here only of his own suffering (‘I 
had had enough’) in having to witness such scenes (poor Eichmann!), and not of the suffering and pain of those 
being murdered before his eyes, partly as a result of his own actions. About all that he is utterly thoughtless. 
Clearly, then, Eichmann was not a thoughtful person. But he did think about some things, although usually not 
in a thoughtful manner, even though he did sometimes think in a (partly) thoughtful manner, as when he (partly) 
freed up the meaning of legality. But we need, however, to loosen up Arendt and Deutscher’s overly close 
conceptual connection between thinking and thoughtfulness and reject the equation between thinking per se and 




Arendt’s account of willing traverses broad terrain, from Paul of Tarsus’ impotent will to Heidegger’s will-not-
to-will. But Arendt gives no clear resolution of the tensions that emerge in this investigation. While Arendt 
rejects Ryle’s claim that willing is a mere illusion,xliv she ends Willing in a mysterious ‘impasse’ which she 
promises to overcome by an appeal to natality and another faculty ‘no less mysterious’, the faculty of 
judgment.xlv Perhaps this unresolved tension, given that tension is the dominant mood of willing, is simply how 
willing necessarily appears to thinking? 
 
Given these problems, Deutscher makes significant and important progress in making sense of Arendt’s account 
of willing. Deutscher argues that: 
 
Willing is elusive. It is neither an action nor a telling of myself what I am to do … Considered as an 
activity, willing is a superstition. (‘From the tarmac, I was willing the plane to land safely.’) I interpret it, 
rather, as a mode – that of being willing.xlvi 
 
Unlike thinking, willing is not an activity, an inner action that precedes and causes an outer action, but a mode 
of being, that of being willing to do what you are going to do, a state of willingly going-to-do something. 
Natality, the birth of a new person, becomes a metaphor for willing, for those actions whereby we set ourselves 
free from conformist behaviour by beginning something new and willingly setting about achieving our projects. 
Willing, then, is understood not as a noumenal interference ‘from above’ in the causal order of the world, but as 
a mode of being within that causal order. 
 
Willing is thus very different to thinking. I can think and think about doing something, but this never amounts to 
actually going to do it. Nor is willing simply desiring, wanting or wishing to do something. I might have always 
desired, wanted or wished to learn Russian, but never actually got around to doing it. I was never willing to do 
it.xlvii Further, I can be willing to do something even when I have no desire to do it. Deutscher gives the example 
of a man who is forced (someone he loves will be tortured if he doesn’t agree) by a criminal gang into being 
willing to drive a getaway vehicle for a bank robbery. He, knowing how much is at stake, becomes willing to 
co-operate. He drives the getaway car willingly, he doesn’t lag in his driving since a ‘failure of will might have 
been fatal,’ even though he has no desire to drive a getaway car in a bank robbery.xlviii Or we can switch the 
example around, and imagine a timid man who has always desired to drive a getaway car in a bank robbery (he 
has seen too many movies), but has never actually been willing to do so, never set about fulfilling that desire. 
These sorts of examples show us that willing is a mode of ‘being willing,’ a ‘directedness, a going-to-do’ 
something.xlix In this sense the will is not some mysterious activity but something we ‘recognise … as a day-to-
day reality.’l 
 
Deutscher uses this account to attack the idea of willing as a commander and slave relation, where we are both 
the one who commands and the one who obeys, since such a divided will is marked by reluctance and 
antagonism, by a lack of being willing. If I obey only because I am commanded then I don’t act willingly. But 
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this example also reveals a tension within Deutscher’s account. It is a tension that is present in the above 
example of the getaway driver who is both willing and reluctant (unwilling?). Such a person seems to be, in one 
sense, commanding himself to act in a certain way, and in another sense, to be a slave who reluctantly carries 
out the commands he is given. Is this a case of being willing to act in a certain way? Does being willing amount 
to going-to-do-something (as when we have a firm will to do what is right, even if we have to force ourselves to 
do this somewhat reluctantly) or going-to-do-something-willingly (so that we also want or desire to act as we 
have set ourselves to act and thus undertake the act willingly, freely, without having to force ourselves)? 
 
Precisely these sorts of examples are central to Kant’s account of willing. Although Kant looms large in 
Arendt’s accounts of thinking and judging, she simply ignores, or rather does not even seem to be aware of, 
Kant’s account of willing.li As such she misses Kant’s distinction between will (Wille) and power of choice 
(Willkür).lii While Wille is a matter of reason, Willkür is a matter of choice. Willkür is always free as it is never 
simply determined by inclinations or reason but rather adopts intentions or maxims (what it is going-to-do) 
through the incorporation of either sensible or rational grounds. Willing is going-to-do something for a reason, 
and that reason can either be conditional on the presence of some contingent desire or interest, or it can be 
categorical and therefore based on the ends-in-themselves status of persons. 
 
In order to prove that pure reason can be practical, Kant considers examples where we set ourselves to do 
something unwillingly.liii He gives the example of a man who is ordered by a tyrant to commit perjury, thereby 
condemning another innocent man to death, but gaining financial reward in the process.liv If he refuses, he will 
be badly tortured and executed. We can read Kant here as arguing that the consequences of refusing to perjure 
ourselves are so horrible that no one would willingly undergo them. But even so, we can choose to do what is 
right by refusing to perjure ourselves. We can will to do so, to be in a state of going-to-do what is right, even if 
this must be done unwillingly. 
 
If this example carries any weight then it shows us that being in a state of going-to-do something, and being 
willing to do it (in the sense of willingness, the absence of reluctance or division), can come apart. Of course, 
Kant does not think that it is a good thing when they do come apart. But, given that our world is one where 
happiness is not distributed according to virtue, it will sometimes happen that what is right is something we are 
unwilling to do, as when morality (as in the case of the tyrant) requires a very great sacrifice of interest or 
opposes what we are very strongly inclined to do. We do not sacrifice these things willingly, but even so, we can 
will to do so. 
 
However, Deutscher also writes that ‘the ‘commanding’ will as bringing order to quarrelling selves is no model 
for being willing. Rather, successful concurrence presupposes people who are willing to command and to 
obey.’lv Drawing on this latter point he differentiates between ‘being repressed into obedience’ and ‘willing to 
be lawful’ (a very Kantian sounding phrase).lvi If willing to be lawful, even when done unwillingly (in the sense 
of reluctantly), counts as an act of willing (as a case of being willing), then our discussion here serves to refine 
rather than contradict Deutscher’s account. But, against this rapprochement, Deutscher writes elsewhere: ‘A 
‘commanding’ will as the mind of one who is not yet willing is a faulty will – a function of a self or society 
divided into antagonism against itself.’lvii The point of Kant’s example, however, is that in some tough moral 
situations internal antagonism is not something that can be avoided. Such internal division is a sign, not of a 
faulty will, but of a morally tough situation that requires a firm will. 
 
In such cases it is not our will that is conflicted or divided against itself, since our will is firm enough. Indeed, in 
Kant’s theory there is no such thing as a divided will. Instead there are different reasons and different sorts of 
reasons (hypothetical and categorical reasons) vying for our attention. Reluctant willing can arise whenever all 
our reasons don’t point in the same direction. For example, if we had chosen to perjure ourselves the source of 
our reluctance to do so would have been countervailing moral reasons, and if we had chosen not to perjure 
ourselves then the source of our reluctance would have been countervailing hypothetical reasons. In one case 
will (Willkür) is at odds with our inclinations and in the other case it is at odds with our reason (Wille). In either 





Thinking is no great mystery, at least when compared to willing and judgment, which are more elusive. We say 
that we are ‘lost in thought’ but never that we are ‘lost in willing or judgment’. This is because thinking is an 
activity. We can point to specific times when we have been thinking. Indeed, as philosophers we sometimes 
spend whole days doing nothing but thinking. But we can’t point to specific moments when we are undertaking 
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some mysterious activity of willing or judgment. We don’t devote whole days to willing or judgment. Even so, 
these are capacities of our minds and it is therefore a mistake to think them away. 
 
What then is judgment? Imagine that I have been appointed the judge of a competition. One afternoon I sit down 
to make a judgment. You ask me what I am doing, and I say, ‘Making a judgment’. But to say this is not to tell 
you what ‘I am doing but what I am to do – what I shall have done when the work judgment requires is 
complete.’lviii After having been willing to think long and hard about the various entries to the competition, their 
relative strengths and weaknesses and so on, I take the plunge, make a judgment, and declare that one of the 
entries is the winner. Thinking takes time, but willing and judgment occur in a flash.lix Even so, we must be 
willing to judge thoughtfully. 
 
To say that judgment (unlike thinking) is not an activity and that it occurs (again, unlike thinking) in a flash, can 
be misleading if we do not differentiate judging from judgment. Judging is a state of coming to a judgment, 
whereas to have judged is to have made a judgment. Judging is often accompanied or preceded by the activity of 
thinking, in particular by representative or enlarged thinking. This explains why, in her discussion of judgment, 
Arendt talks about an enlarged way of thinking which is ‘active in judging.’lx To think in an enlarged way, or to 
think representatively, is to think about the matter we are trying to reach judgment on from the perspective of a 
community of fellow judgers. Having undertaken such thinking we are often better placed to make a good 
judgment, the sort of judgment that we expect others to agree with. Judgment is thus a way of ‘sharing-the-
world-with-others,’ of seeing the world from the perspective of common sense (a sensing of the world that is 
common to all, a shared world) that transcends our five private senses, and is thus one of our ‘fundamental 
abilities’ as political beings.lxi But thinking, even representative thinking, cannot take the place of judgment, 
since even after I have thought long and hard about a matter, I still have the work of judgment ahead of me. 
 
However, we don’t always have the time to stop and think before we judge; sometimes we must, while on the 
run, make a judgment straight away. But even in these cases judgment is never a matter of simply leaping to a 
conclusion. As Deutscher notes, the judge who declares his judgment as a result of sheer prejudice, rather than 
as a result of weighing the evidence (however poorly), has not made a bad judgment but has failed to judge at 
all.lxii Such a judge pre-judges the case; he leaps straight to a conclusion rather than makes a judgment. To see 
why, consider another case. Deutscher gives the example of a runner who, ‘[h]aving no time to pause and 
consider,’ must ‘judge (‘on the run’) whether she can ‘clear an obstacle in a leap.’lxiii While there is no time for 
the runner to thoughtfully consider the matter, she must still judge. ‘To just leap would be to abdicate from 
judgment.’lxiv The person of prejudice just leaps straight to a conclusion, and just leaping is not even judging on 
the run. To judge is not to guess or blindly leap, but to bring our thought, knowledge, skills and experience to 
bear upon the matter.lxv 
 
Drawing on this account Deutscher attempts to deal with the much discussed problem of the actor-spectator split 
in Arendt’s account (or accounts) of judgment.lxvi This problem seems to arise since Arendt develops two 
accounts of judgment, one from the perspective of the engaged actor who wants to work out what to do, and 
another from the perspective of the disengaged spectator who plays no part in the action at hand and who wants 
to weave facts into a meaningful story. But it is not clear that these two accounts sit comfortably together. There 
thus seems to be a schism between actor and spectator judgment which threatens to undermine the overall 
coherency of Arendt’s account. 
 
We can see how Deutscher deals with this problem by drawing on the examples of judging on the run and 
judging a competition. In the first case the runner is in the thick of things and has no time to thoughtfully 
consider her options before she jumps. This looks like actor-judging. In the second case the competition judge 
has plenty of time to thoughtfully consider the various entries (none of which belong to her) before she comes to 
a judgment. This looks like spectator-judging. On this point Deutscher writes: 
 
Arendt maintains, nevertheless, that we take up a temporary role as spectator when we go to will and 
judge. Her idea is that judging requires a use of the spectator’s point of view, not that judging is locked 
into it. Critics fail to recognise that her ‘spectator’ is only partially and temporarily separated from the 
[actor’s] playing field.lxvii 
 
There is thus no rupture between the actor and the spectator. The runner is a partial and involved actor who, 
while on the run, taps into the spectator’s perspective in order to judge whether or not she can clear the obstacle 
in a single bound. Although some spectators may make more permanent and long-term departures from the 
actor’s playing field, they need not do so in order to be spectators. The same person might be judging 
competitions one moment, like a spectator, and judging leaps the next, like an actor. Further, spectators are often 
not disinterested as they battle with others over the meaning of past events. But to the extent that such spectators 
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are interested parties engaged in history wars they are also actors trying to make past events meaningful in a 
particular way. Just as we can be spectators while playing on the actor’s field, we can also be actors while 
sitting on the spectator’s bench. 
 
However, while Deutscher is right to reject any attempt to overplay the actor-spectator distinction, it is equally 
important not to, as Deutscher risks doing, underplay it. Arendt highlights different features of actor and 
spectator judgments (these different features should be read as common, but hardly necessary or exclusive, 
characteristics).lxviii For Arendt, the actor (and here Arendt means specifically the political actor, a person 
working out how to share the world with others) deliberates about what they will do and this makes them partial, 
interested, involved, concerned with gaining doxa or fame, and subject to the standards set by spectators.lxix In 
contrast to the actor, the spectator (and here Arendt means specifically the historian, storyteller, novelist, poet, 
playwright, philosopher and so on) deliberates, not about what they are to do, but about the meaning of past 
actions, and this makes them impartial, disinterested, uninvolved, concerned with conferring and not gaining 
fame, and the setters of the standards by which actors are to be judged.lxx  
 
Further, actor and spectator judgments differ not only in the ways that Arendt highlights above, but also in terms 
of the different roles that Arendt sees them as playing. Actor-judgment has the role of doing the political heavy-
lifting of justifying political values, principles and decisions. Spectator-judgment has the role of doing the 
existential heavy-lifting of making our being in the world a meaningful and worthwhile activity. It is the actor 
who, under the guidance of forward-looking judgment, performs meaningful actions and makes decisions about 
what to do. It is the spectator who, under the guidance of backward–looking judgment, makes those actions 
meaningful by making judgments about them, revealing their purpose and meaning, and thereby reconciling 
both actors and spectators alike to the way the world is.lxxi These two accounts are not in tension since they are 
not even in competition. Each account simply reveals a different role for, or type of, judgment. One type of 
judgment is more forward-looking and the other more backward-looking. One type is more political, and the 
other is more existential, and so on. However, while Deutscher helps us to understand the similarities between 




The problem with a thoughtful book, such as Judgment After Arendt, is that it tends to raises more questions 
than it definitively answers. We have investigated some of these questions here. In particular, we have 
challenged the claim that Eichmann did not think, even though he was a thoughtless person. With regard to 
willing, we examined the tension inherent in the idea of ‘being willing’, a tension that arises because this state 
can be understood as going-to-do-something and going-to-do-it-willingly. We saw that in difficult moral cases 
these can come apart. In such cases we need a firm will, even if this is accompanied by some reluctance. Finally, 
in regard to judgment, while following Deutscher’s lead in bringing actor and spectator judgment closer 
together, we also cautioned against ignoring the differences between these two different types of judgments. No 
doubt there will be some problems with the arguments defended here. Further, there are also many important 
issues that Deutscher examines in his rich book that we have not been able to think about here at all. And so the 
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